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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION 1.
CARL H. FULDA* and HOWARD C. KLEMME**
While our article on this subject in the preceding issue of this
Journal' was being printed, Congress suddenly bestirred itself to finally
pass a uniform statute of limitations for anti-trust treble damage actions
brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act.2 The new law adds to the
Clayton Act a new section 4A giving to the United States a cause of
action for single damages and a new section 4B which reads as follows:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections
4 and 4A shall be forever barred unless commenced Within
four years after the cause of action accrued. No cause of action
barred under existing law on the effective date of this Act shall
be revived by this Act.
The new law also amends the present tolling provisions in accord-
ance with the proposal already discussedV: The limitation period is sus-
pended during the pendency of a government suit and for one year there-
after, with the effect that a treble damadge plaintiff must bring his action
either within four years from the accrual of his cause of action or within
one year after the government suit ceased to be pending. The report
of the Senate Committee4 explains this provision on grounds similar to
those we had suggested.5
The new statute will take effect on January 7, 1956, six months
after its enactment.
Under these circumstances, it may be appropriate to add to our
previous discussion a brief supplement explaining the effect of this new
legislation.
In the first 'place, the present law will remain unchanged in every
respect until next January seventh. On that date, however, the uniform
four-year period will supersede the various state statutes now limiting
treble damage claims. The transition from widely differing periods to a
uniform four-year period of limitation raises problems, because the
presently applicable period of limitation is less than four years in many
states, and longer than four years in many others, Ohio and New York
being included among the latter group of states.'
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The plain language of the new statute answers at least one of these
transitional difficulties. Any cause of action presently subject to a limitation
period of less than four years will be barred on January 7, 1956, if on that
date the presently applicable statute has run, although" less than four years
may have elapsed since the accrual of that cause of action."
But what will happen to causes of action now subject to a limitation
period of more than four years? The statute itself gives no answer to
this question. However, the House Report states:
... the bill provides that the effective date of the measure
shall be 6 months after its enactment. This provision will give a
half-year period of grace within which treble damage actions
may be brought by persons whose causes of action have accrued
for more than four years, and who wish to bring suit in those
states having applicable statutes of limitations greater than the
4
-year period provided for herein. Thus, where the State statute
of limitations is longer than the new Federal Statute, 6 months
is provided from the date of enactment of this measure for those
whose rights may be cut off by the new limitation to bring their
cases to court.
8
Thus, a plaintiff whose cause of action accrued more than four years prior
to January 7, 1956, and is now subject to a limitation period longer than
four years which has not yet run, may bring his action at any time until
the effective date of the new statute. If he fails to do so; he will be
barred.9
Significantly, the new law does not change the present legal rules
governing accrual of the cause of action 0 or the suspension of the period
of limitation as a result of a government suitel except for the addition
of the new provision noted above terminating suspension within one year
after conclusion of the government suit.
Finally, the new statute does not mention private injunction suits
under section 16 of the Clayton Act; nevertheless, it might be held ap-
plicable to such suits.12
7 See S. REP., jupra note 4, at p. 5. H. R. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong. 1st Sess.,
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